

### On a Supposed Right to the Fulfillment of Desires and Inclinations

Most pigs have as their object some form of laziness, a laziness good and necessary in itself, without which the form of life that defines a pig is entirely absent. Laziness is a kind of causality arising from pleasure; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it independent from duty, which is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth.

Now, all pigs can be either big or little, which is subjectively rather than objectively important. The former represents what comes as a result of inexcusable gluttony, and since it is of little importance, it will not be further discussed here. On the other hand, little pigs, being the object of this discourse deserves further attention. Little pigs can naturally be divided into three kinds. This division is perfectly suitable for the current purposes and no other improvement can be made except perhaps to insure the completeness and correctness of such a division.

We shall find that there exists several distinctive natures characteristic of little pigs. The first kind of pig has the lowest regard for duty, so that laziness is the supreme limiting condition of all ends, whatever they may be; and hence this pig when confronted with the necessity of a dwelling for protection from the many dangers of nature decide for the subjectively easiest method. These pigs are found to create their huts of straw so that they may as quickly as possible return to their previous state of frolicking. It is obvious that the principle governing the will of such a pig must be a hypothetical and not a categorical one since it is a contradiction in the idea itself to will such that all pigs build a weak and unsteady shelter. Thus, it cannot be a moral law that pigs are as of this kind.

On the other extreme can be found the type of pig that controls the will completely with reason and none at all with desires and inclinations. Faced with the objective necessity of living, this little pig is empirically in similar condition as the first category of pigs. But by means of natural reason and a reference to the objective ends, pigs of this sort build their homes from bricks; their inclinations for pleasure and laziness being controlled by reason and never being used as an end in itself.

In the middle of these two extremes is the moderate pig that contains both principles of laziness and duty. Types of this sort generally have houses built from sticks, which require more effort than those of the first type of pig mentioned before, but also require comparably less work than of the other sort.

The question then arises: how are all of these pigs possible? In the previous discussion of pigs, an assumption was made that such pigs exist objectively and not only formally because such an assumption was needed if the related concepts were to be explained a priori. But this proposition cannot in itself be proved, nor can it be proved in this section as such questions belong to a different science of metaphysics.

One can see, however, that everything in nature works according to laws. In the natural world, little pigs are often desired by what is sometimes known as a wolf. The wolf is categorically, i.e. universally and unconditionally, required to seek out the necessary means to subsistence. It may be noted further than unless we want to deny to the concept of instinct all reference to a possible object that it must necessarily be that such a principle is objectively necessary.

Supposing that by the natural necessities characteristic of similar non-rational beings a wolf is compelled by the totality of apperception of the first variety of pig to the

entryway of the hut made of straw. There arises from this supposition a confrontation involving a compelling urge to inflate the organ most commonly used for respiration, which only proves, and necessarily must prove, by examples and from experience, that pig rationality of the first kind is most dangerous, as the scrambling pig must surely agree.

The second type of pigs and the living quarters created by such is likewise not an exception to the universal principle of the wolf, even though this form of the pig conforms to duty and less to pleasurable inclinations than the previous one. There arises from these circumstances an unavoidable conclusion as the wolf either completely devours all little pigs of the previous two forms or they all find themselves at the bricks of the third and last type of pigs.

Another characteristic sometimes attributed to the wolf is that of persistence as the instinct for a pig dinner is strong enough that the wolf can switch his attack to the housing of the remaining type of pig; but nothing can be found in the wolf that can bring down the solidly impenetrable brick walls built by such pigs. And hence the wolf willing with his natural desires, suspends his reason, and finds the cozy chimney and soon regrets the natural instinctive desires that have taken control. Nevertheless, even though one might never be able to understand the manner of the wolf, yet this apparent irrationality might at least be resolved in a credible manner, by removing rationality from such and all related beings, and reserving reason for pigs, especially of the last kind.

And so even though we do not grasp much of this natural necessity, all we can safely say is that little pigs do eventually live in a happy state; however happiness should never be the objective end if we desire to approach the very limit of reason.